QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ABOUT NEW 👎USA PORT COSTS
On October 14, 2025, the U.S. plans to impose hefty new port fees targeting China-built, owned, or operated vessels. COSCO — the world’s 4th-largest container carrier — faces a potential $1.5B annual hit.
But the stakes go beyond COSCO.
This decision could reshape transpacific trade, force carriers into new alliances, and spark a major capacity shuffle.
The questions everyone’s asking:
Can COSCO absorb a $1.5B financial blow?
Will U.S.–China trade tensions escalate further?
How will Ocean Alliance partners react?
Will non-Chinese carriers exploit this gap?
Could we see a complete rerouting of U.S. container flows?
This is a significant escalation in U.S.-China trade tensions, and the new port fees, set to take effect on October 14, 2025, are already causing major ripples across the global shipping industry.
Here is a breakdown of the key questions based on current market analysis and reported reactions:
Can COSCO absorb a $1.5B financial blow?
• Financial Impact: Analysts estimate that COSCO Group (including its subsidiary OOCL) could face fees reaching over $1.5 billion annually, potentially representing a substantial portion of the total estimated $3.2 billion burden on the top 10 carriers. The cost could be as high as $2,121 per TEU for COSCO's U.S.-bound services, compared to much smaller figures for non-Chinese carriers like Maersk.
• Response: Despite the massive potential cost, COSCO and OOCL have reportedly stated they will not impose surcharges on shippers to cover the new fees. This suggests a strategic decision to absorb the cost, possibly with support or subsidies from the Chinese government, to maintain market share and competitive rates in the transpacific trade lane.
However, absorbing a $1.5B hit is a severe challenge, even for a state-backed giant.
Will U.S.–China trade tensions escalate further?
• Escalation is Likely: The new fees are a direct result of a Section 301 investigation into China's maritime industry and are clearly aimed at limiting Chinese dominance.
• China's Response: China's State Council has revised its rules on international maritime transport, signaling it will take necessary countermeasures against countries imposing discriminatory restrictions. These potential countermeasures include:
• Charging special fees on U.S.-owned or flagged vessels calling at Chinese ports.
• Prohibiting or restricting their port access in China.
• Barring them from accessing China-related maritime data.
• The implementation of the fees is seen as a clear escalation in the trade war, with Beijing unlikely to stand idly by.
How will Ocean Alliance partners react?
• Ocean Alliance consists of COSCO/OOCL, CMA CGM, and Evergreen.
• Diverging Strategies: While COSCO/OOCL faces the steepest charges, partners like CMA CGM have indicated that, based on the current structure of the fees, they do not plan to implement a surcharge to cover the costs.
• Alliance Dynamics: The fees could strain the alliance. CMA CGM and Evergreen, who rely heavily on Chinese-built vessels (which also face a fee, though smaller than for Chinese-owned/operated ships), have an incentive to reduce their exposure to these vessels on U.S. routes. This is already leading to an observed reduction in the deployment of Chinese-built ships in transpacific trades. The alliance partners will need to find ways to balance slot exchanges and fleet deployment to minimize the collective fee burden, potentially leading to a subtle capacity shuffle within the alliance network.
Will non-Chinese carriers exploit this gap?
• Opportunity for Others: Carriers like Maersk, MSC, Hapag-Lloyd, and ZIM are significantly less exposed to the highest fees and stand to gain. They are actively seeking to replace Chinese-built or Chinese-leased vessels with fee-exempt ships (built in countries like South Korea or Japan) on U.S. routes.
• Market Concentration Risk: Paradoxically, if COSCO and OOCL are effectively priced out of U.S. calls due to the fees, it could reduce competition. Fewer competitors in the transpacific lane could ultimately lead to higher prices and more limited options for U.S. shippers over the long term, despite the current market soft patch.
Could we see a complete rerouting of U.S. container flows?
• Rerouting is Happening: A complete rerouting is a strong possibility. The fee structure provides explicit exemptions for smaller ships and certain short-haul trades, potentially driving more cargo through transshipment hubs in:
• Canada (e.g., Prince Rupert)
• Mexico
• The Caribbean
• Strategy: Carriers can unload containers at these intermediate ports and then use smaller, exempt vessels for the final, short-haul leg into the U.S., or use intermodal rail/trucking, effectively rerouting the final ocean-leg away from the fee structure.
• Impact: This shift would increase transshipment volumes in neighboring countries and could eventually lead to changes in where major carriers focus their new infrastructure investments.
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